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Abstract
Optimal Information Design and Incentive Contracts with Performance
Measure Manipulation
We study how a rm owner motivates a manager to create value by optimally de-
signing an information system and a compensation contract based on a manipulable
performance measure. In equilibrium, the rm either implements a perfect or an unin-
formative system. The information system and the pay-performance sensitivity (PPS)
of the compensation contract can be substitutes in a sense that the rm optimally
combines a perfect information system with a low PPS or an uninformative system
with a high PPS. Because the information design is endogenous, rms facing relatively
high manipulation threat may oer nancial incentives that are higher-powered than
the ones oered by their peers facing lower manipulation threat. If the manager is in
charge of implementing the information system, he chooses a perfect one unless the rm
uses the information for internal control. The rm may prefer to commit to an internal
control level before observing any information.
Keywords: Bayesian persuasion, ex ante information design, performance manipula-
tion, earnings management, incentive contracting, multi-task problem
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1 Introduction
Because rm value is a long-term and hard to measure objective, rms frequently rely
on short-term performance measures (e.g., earnings) that are prone to manipulation by
managers. Compensating managers on the basis of such measures calls for low-powered
incentives (Beyer, Guttman and Marinovic 2014). The reason is that strong incentives
encourage manipulation (Baker 1992; Feltham and Xie 1994). However, the empirical
literature provides mixed evidence regarding the association between nancial incen-
tives and earnings management and attributes it to the dierences in empirical research
designs and methodologies.1 How much managers manipulate depends not only on the
strength of their incentives, but also on their task productivity and the degree to which
their performance measures are prone to manipulation. Furthermore, the way managers
react to nancial incentives and, more broadly, the economic consequences of their ac-
tions, depends on the information available to them when making economic decisions.
The availability of decision-relevant information is, to a large extent, determined by
the type and the precision of information sources (e.g., accounting tools, business in-
telligence systems, or consulting services) that rms choose to acquire. Accounting for
the endogenous nature of information availability, we nd that, paradoxically, rms
may optimally provide managers with high-powered incentives when the underlying
performance measure is more prone to manipulation.
Our study predicts that rms not always benet from acquiring sophisticated sources
of information.2 The reason is that access to more precise information facilitates not
only value creation but possibly also unproductive activities. Managers who understand
1Several studies show evidence consistent with a positive association between nancial incentives
and earnings management (e.g., Larcker, Richardson and Tuna 2007; Harris and Bromiley 2007), while
others show evidence consistent with a negative association (e.g., Armstrong, Jagolinzer and Larcker
2010), or no association (e.g., Erickson, Hanlon and Maydew 2006; Baber, Kang and Liang 2007). For
detailed discussion of the research methodologies see Armstrong, Jagolinzer and Larcker (2010).
2In line with this prediction, empirical studies suggest that the use of advanced information sources
is not necessarily associated with a higher rm performance and varies across rms. Cagwin and
Bouwman (2002) nd that the use of activity-based costing is associated with a higher ROI, whereas
Ittner, Lanen and Larcker (2002) nd that it is only weakly related to protability. Brynjolfsson and
McElheran (2016) nd that, although the use of data-driven-decision making is associated with better
performance, only 30% of the manufacturing rms in US have implemented it.
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better how their actions translate into measures of rm performance are typically also
better prepared to game the system to their own advantage and realize higher compen-
sation or other private benets.3 Therefore, rms face a trade-o between the additional
prot derived from more informed productive decisions and the costs of more informed
gaming. This trade-o inuences not only the rm's choice of information sources, but
also the closely related decision of how to design the compensation schemes of the rm
managers. It therefore emphasizes the importance of studying information design and
nancial incentives simultaneously.
In this paper, we ask how rms motivate managers to create value by optimally de-
signing the sources of decision-relevant information and compensation contracts based
on manipulable performance measures. We are especially interested in how these in-
struments are optimally combined in solving the underlying agency problem and, more
particularly, how the information design aects the pay-performance sensitivity (PPS)
of the compensation contract. We address this problem in the context of an earnings
management model where a rm owner or board of directors (the principal, \she")
compensates a manager (the agent, \he") on the basis of short-term earnings because
the terminal value is realized too late to serve as a basis for compensation.4 The earn-
ings reect the agent's contribution to rm value but are also aected by unproductive
\window dressing" which inates earnings but diminishes rm value.
Both activities are unobservable, personally costly to the agent, and their marginal
productivities depend on an unknown parameter of the economic environment such as
a market or rm characteristic that aects production or sales (e.g., customers' taste or
wilngness to pay). We ask whether the principal can improve the contractual solution
of the agency problem by designing an information system such as purchasing a data
collection and analysis software or hiring an adviser or consultant (e.g., contracting
3Anecdotal evidence on recent fraud cases underscores the importance of the problem. A key
factor in the Enron scandal was the know-how on structuring complex nancial transactions and
accounting procedures partly acquired through consulting services from the CPA rm Arthur Anderson
(Benston and Hartgraves 2002). Likewise, Volkswagen used sophisticated engineering know-how to
evade emissions standards. (Elson, Ferrere and Goosen 2015). In both cases the information used for
gaming the system could have also been used to create rm value.
4The average tenure of a CEO is 6-7 years (Marcec 2018).
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with a market research rm to create focus groups and determine the customer's taste
or willingness to pay) that provides the rm with a (potentially noisy) signal about the
unknown parameter before the agent takes his actions.5 To address this question we
employ a Bayesian persuasion framework where the design of the information system
is chosen before the information-dependent decisions are made.6
We rst show that the principal's problem of information design reduces to the
choice between an uninformative and a perfect information system, and that this choice
critically depends on the nancial incentives of the agent.7 For a given incentive con-
tract, information and incentives are substitutes in a sense that a higher PPS makes
the choice of a perfect information system less likely. Specically, there is a unique
threshold for the PPS of the agent's contract above which the principal strictly prefers
an uninformative system over a perfect one and vice versa.8
The driving force behind this result is that precise information improves the pro-
ductive action of the agent and thereby the expected benet to the principal net of
the cost for which she needs to compensate the agent. However, precise information
also improves the unproductive action and thereby the expected total cost due to ma-
nipulation borne by the principal. To x ideas, suppose that the unknown parameter
represents customers' taste or willingness to pay. Information about the customers'
taste and willingness to pay enables the manager to predict the market demand and
plan production accordingly{this increases rm value. However, knowing customers'
taste and willingness to pay may also facilitate production of extra units that will be
sold at a value destroying price.
5The decision for investment in database, software or hiring of experts and advisers that gather and
provide managers with decision-relevant information is typically taken by a board of directors before
managers have to make operation decisions.
6The order in which the principal contracts with the agent and implements the information system
is irrelevant as long as those are made before the agent chooses activity levels. This is consistent with
the rms' choices in practice.
7The preference for either perfect or no information is driven by the assumption that the implemen-
tation of the information system is cost-free. We discuss the implications of relaxing this assumption
in Section 3.
8Any existing information within the rm, beyond the one generated by the information system,
will be captured by the prior beliefs of the principal and the agent.
3
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3484199 
We illustrate that, while the information eect on the principal's surplus due to
production is increasing at a decreasing rate in the PPS, the information eect on the
principal's surplus from manipulation is decreasing at an accelerating rate. Thus, if
the PPS is suciently low, the overall information eect is positive and the principal
benets from implementing a system that generates perfect information. However, if
the PPS is suciently high, the overall information eect is negative and the principal
prefers an uninformative system.
Once we establish that the principal's problem simplies to a choice between a
perfect and an uninformative system for any contract, we proceed by determining the
optimal PPS conditional on perfect and no information. In equilibrium, the principal
chooses the pair (information system and PPS) that yields the highest value. We show
that the equilibrium PPS is discontinuous and relates closely to the degree to which
the performance measure is prone to gaming (i.e., manipulation treat). Specically,
in the absence of manipulation threat, the rm always benets from implementing
perfect information system because this allows the agent to take informed productive
actions. Consistently, the rm also nds it optimal to provide high-powered incentives.
A slight increase in manipulation threat does not discourage the rm from implementing
a perfect information system but it lowers the PPS of the agent's contract. There is
a critical level of manipulation threat beyond which the implementation of a perfect
information system is no longer benecial to the rm. We nd that switching to an
uninformative system results in an increase of the equilibrium PPS.
The preceding discussion implies that, in equilibrium, information system and PPS
can be substitutes in solving the rm's incentive problem in the sense that there is always
a set of rms that optimally combine a perfect information system with a low PPS and
a second set of rms that optimally combine an uninformative system with a higher
PPS. The former set of rms face a relatively lower manipulation threat compared with
the one that the latter set of rms face. Thus, rms using performance measures that
are more prone to gaming may optimally provide higher-powered incentives than rms
using performance measures that are less prone to gaming. This result complements the
4
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predictions made by prior literature studying optimal incentives for a given information
environment (e.g., Beyer, Guttman and Marinovic 2014) and may shed a new light on
the mixed empirical evidence. Specically, future empirical studies could exploit our
predictions by accounting for the information environment and the manipulation threat
in their research design.
We study two extensions of our model. First, we analyze the interplay between in-
formation design and internal control. Control raises the agent's manipulation cost and
can be chosen by the principal before (henceforth: \early control") or after (henceforth:
\late control") the signal is generated. Late control is excessive because it ignores the
fact that, in equilibrium, the principal bears the agent's manipulation cost.9 Therefore,
the principal prefers late control only with a perfect information system and provided
that the informational benets are higher than the cost of overinvesting in control.
Second, we study the equilibrium of a slightly modied game where the agent has the
authority over the information design. We rst show that, in the absence of internal
control, the agent always implements a perfect information system because his expected
compensation is increasing in both activity levels which makes informed choices valu-
able for the agent. We establish the same result in the presence of early internal control.
However, with late internal control, the agent chooses an uninformative system when-
ever the manipulation threat is suciently pronounced. The reason is that in this case
the agent's benet from informed actions is lower than his loss from allowing the prin-
cipal to make an informed choice of control level. Moreover, in line with the qualitative
predictions of our baseline setting, we identify a non-empty range of model parameters
for which the PPS is monotonically increasing as the performance measure becomes
more prone to gaming.
This paper contributes to the literature on performance measure manipulation. In a
part of this literature the manager privately observes the rm's actual performance and
issues a potentially distorted report to the principal (Arya, Glover and Sunder 1998; Dye
1988; Demski 1998). Another part of this literature is based on the multi-task version
9This result relates to Arya, Glover and Sivaramakrishnan (1997b).
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of the moral hazard problem (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1990; Feltham and Xie 1994)
and considers earnings management in single-period settings (Dutta and Gigler 2002;
Crocker and Slemrod 2007; Beyer, Guttman and Marinovic 2014) or in multi-period
settings (Demski, Frimor and Sappington 2004; Liang 2004; Dutta and Fan 2014).
In our model the manager also inates earnings at a personal cost but our focus
is on the ability of the principal to improve the contractual solution of the agency
problem by designing a system that provides decision-relevant information. In that
sense, our paper is related to the literature studying the consequences of post-contract,
pre-decision information for the optimal solution of a standard moral hazard model
(Penno 1984; Baiman and Sivaramakrishnan 1991; Baker 1992; Bushman, Indjejikian
and Penno 2000; Christensen and Feltham 2005). Dierent from us, these papers
assume that the agent's pre-decision information is typically privately observed by the
agent and not observed by the principal. Several studies (e.g., Baiman and Evans 1983;
Christensen and Demski 2003; Hofmann and Rothenberg 2013) allow for the post-
contract, pre-decision information to be public and discuss its desirability for solving
the risk-incentive trade-o. Dierent from us, they focus on single-task models.
In contrast to our model, the literature on post-contract, pre-decision information
typically takes the properties of the information system as given and does not consider
optimal information design. We employ a Bayesian persuasion framework in which
the structure of the information system is a choice of the principal.10 Georgiades and
Szentes (2018) propose a continuous time agency model, where the principal can acquire
informative signals to monitor the agent's eort choice. Boleslavsky and Kim (2018)
study a sender-receiver game, in which the outcome distribution is jointly determined
by the agent's eort and the receivers' actions. To the best of our knowledge, our paper
10Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) formalize the idea that a sender can persuade a receiver to take
a certain action by committing to an information design. Earlier studies have also considered ex
ante commitment to information dissemination (Arya, Glover and Sivaramakrishnan 1997a; Gox and
Wagenhofer 2009). Several studies have extended these models to settings with multiple receivers (e.g.,
Michaeli 2017), multiple senders (e.g., Gentzkow and Kamenica 2017), inecient project continuation
(Bertomeu and Cheynel 2015), information acquisition by receivers (Huang 2016), and the interaction
between ex-ante design of public information and ex-post disclosure of private information (Friedman,
Hughes and Michaeli 2019).
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is the rst to consider such model in the context of an earnings management problem.
Our paper also relates to the signal jamming models in which a manager can issue
a biased report to boost market expectations about the rm value (Stein 1989; Fischer
and Verrecchia 2000; Dye and Sridhar 2004; Ewert and Wagenhofer 2005). A common
assumption in this literature is that the agent's compensation contract is given. An
exception is Goldman and Slezak (2006), who allow for productive eort and endoge-
nous contracts but, unlike us, assume that the marginal productivity of the agent's
production and manipulation eorts are uncorrelated and common knowledge. Lastly,
our model extension in section 4 relates to the literature on internal controls (Pae and
Yoo 2001; Ewert and Wagenhofer 2018; Schantl and Wagenhofer 2018).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the economic setting. Section
3 determines the prot maximizing combinations of information system and incentive
contracts in solving the rm's multi-task problem. Section 4 extends our results by
considering internal controls and authority over information design. Section 5 concludes.
A summary of all model variables and the proofs are in Appendix A. Appendix B
includes alternative ways of modeling information design.
2 Economic setting
A risk neutral manager (the agent, \he") runs a rm on behalf of a risk neutral owner
(the principal, \she").11 The agent can increase the rm's terminal value x by his pro-
ductive activity ar. We assume that the terminal value is not contractible.
12 However,
there is a potentially biased performance measure y available for contracting. Subse-
11To keep the analysis tractable and focus on the interplay between the information system and the
multi-task problem, we assume that all players are risk neutral (Beyer, Guttman and Marinovic 2014).
12This assumption is common in the agency literature (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1990; Baker 1992;
Feltham and Xie 1994) and is motivated by the fact that the terminal value is realized after the relevant
contracting horizon (the average CEO tenure is 6-7 years; see Marcec 2018). Since x is not contractible,
the principal cannot sell the rm to the agent (as an owner, the agent would have no incentives to bias
the rm's earnings). Additional reasons preventing the agent from taking this position include limited
wealth or lack of liquid assets on the part of the agent, private benets of control on the part of the
contracting party such as a board of directors, or shareholders' synergies with other business activities
(see also Crocker and Slemrod 2007; Beyer, Guttman and Marinovic 2014).
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quently, we refer to y as the rm's earnings.13
The rm's earnings are aected by the agent's productive activity ar but also by an
unproductive activity at that we interpret as performance manipulation or the agent's
earnings management. As in the models of Goldman and Slezak (2006) or Ewert and
Wagenhofer (2005), we allow that earnings management has a real eect on rm value.14
Specically, we assume that the rm value is reduced by (y x) if earnings exceed the
fundamental value, where   0 measures the severity of the real consequences of the
agent's manipulation. If  = 0, the agent's earnings manipulation has pure accounting
consequences but no impact on the rm value. In contrast, if  > 0, increasing earnings
by one dollar reduces the rm value by  dollars.
Both the value-creating and the manipulation activities are personally costly to the
agent. To avoid that cost dierences are pivotal for our results, we assume that the
curvature of the cost function is the same for both activities, so that identical levels of
production and manipulation cost the same. Specically, we assume that the cost C()
of either activity is increasing and strictly convex with C(0) = 0 and C 00() = c > 0. Let
s(y) denote the agent's compensation as a function of realized earnings y. To keep the
model tractable, we assume that the principal relies on an ane compensation contract
s(y) = w + vy, where w is a lump sum transfer and v 2 [0; 1] is the incentive rate or
the PPS of the agent's compensation contract.
The ex-post utility of the agent is u = s(y) C(ar) C(at) and the ex-post payo of
the principal sums up to  = x (y x) s(y). We assume that the rm's fundamental
value and its earnings take the form
x = r(r)  ar; (1)
y = r(r)  ar + t(t)  at + "; (2)
13Many public rms use non-GAAP measures of earnings such as EBIT, EBITDA or other forms
of adjusted earnings. Since these metrics are not prepared according to generally accepted accounting
principles, senior management has considerable more discretion in their preparation (Larcker and
Tayan 2016; Pozen and Kothari 2017; Sherman and Young 2018).
14Examples of real earnings management include over-production (Roychowdhury 2006), R&D cuts
(Baber, Faireld, and Haggard 1991; Rozenbaum 2017), advertising decreases (Cohen, Mashruwala,
and Zach 2010) and compromises in workplace safety (Caskey and Ozel 2017). These activities diminish
the rm value (Bhojraj, Hribar, Picconi, and McInnis 2009; Cohen and Zarowin 2010).
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and are functions of the agent's activities and their marginal productivity i(i), i 2
fr; tg. The marginal productivities depend on the realizations of two random variables,
r and t, that we dene in more detail below. Furthermore, " is a noise term distributed
according to some known distribution, with mean zero and unbounded support. We
assume that i(i) is an ane function of i so that i(0) = k0 > 0 and i
0(i) = ki > 0;
for i 2 fr; tg.15 Here, k0 represent the deterministic part of the productivity which,
without loss of generality, we normalize to one. Furthermore, ki is a positive constant
measuring the sensitivity to the unknown parameter i. For the majority of our results
only the ratio   kr=kt > 0 will matter.
The parameters r and t capture the aggregate impact of factors (e.g., product or
input market conditions, the eciency of the rm's production process, the legal and the
regulatory environment) that determine the productivity of the activities. While many
of these factors are activity-specic, others are common and aect the productivity
of both activities. To distinguish between the two types of factors, we assume that
i = +i, where i 2 [; ]; i 2 fr; tg represents the activity-specic shocks distributed
according to some known distribution with mean zero. The common parameter  2
 = [; ] represents all variables that aect the productivity of both activities and, to
ensure that the marginal productivity is non-negative for all realizations of i, i 2 fr; tg,
we assume that   0  . For example,  could represent unknown factors aecting the
market demand such as customer taste and willingness to pay. Being able to predict the
market demand facilitates production planning and thereby value creation. However,
knowing customer taste and willingness to pay may also facilitate production of extra
units which increases the agent's compensation but destroys rm value because the
extra units are sold at a very low price.
We assume that  is distributed according to probability distribution f() and cu-
mulative distribution F () with mean E[] and variance V ar(). The principal can
implement an information system (e.g., acquire a data collection and analysis software
or hire an adviser) that will provide a signal  2  about , where   . In our moti-
15With this structure there is always a non-trivial agency problem (i.e. at > 0) regardless of the
expectation about i.
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vating example, the implementation of information system could represent contracting
with a market research rm that will create focus groups to investigate the customer
taste or willingness to pay and report the results to the rm. The signal is observable
by the principal and the agent.16 We rule out message games and assume that the
signal is neither contractible, nor veriable by third parties such as court.17
The information system determines the probability distribution function g() and the
cumulative distribution function G() of the posterior j for a given signal realization
. Hence the choice of the information system in our model is represented by a choice
of g().18 Consistent beliefs imply that the condition E[G(j)] = F () has to hold
(Bayesian plausibility). The set of all plausible distributions include, as special cases, a
perfect information system and an uninformative one. In the former case it holds that
g(j) = 0 for any  6=  so that the information system perfectly reveals . In the
latter case, g(j) = f() so that the agent takes his decisions on the basis of his prior
beliefs about .19 We assume that, whenever indierent, the principal implements a
perfect information system.
The timeline of events is presented in Figure 1. At date 1, the states r and t are
realized but not observed by the parties. At date 2, the principal oers a contract s(y)
to the agent and implements an information system with design g() to maximize her
expected payo ()  E[()]. At date 3, the information system generates a publicly
observable signal  about , the agent updates his beliefs and chooses ar and at to
maximize his expected utility conditional on the signal realization E[u()j]. At date
16It seems reasonable that the principal observes the signal generated by the information system
that she implements. However, the assumption that the principal observes  is irrelevant for our main
results.
17This assumption rules out that the principal can condition the agent's compensation contract on
the realized signal.
18To illustrate and complement the general denition of the information system, we provide two
more specic examples of information systems in Appendix B. An alternative interpretation of our
model is that the principal contracts with a manger who has an observable ability of learning the
decision-relevant parameter . In such case, the choice of g() represents the choice of the manager to
be hired.
19In our model, the prior beliefs incorporate any additional information available within the rm
beyond the one generated by the information system. Hence, an uninformative system should not be
interpreted as a complete lack of information.
10
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1
r and t
are realized
2
Principal
oers s(y) and
chooses g()
3
 is realized;
The agent
choses ar; at
4
Payos
are realized
Figure 1: Timeline
4, the ex-post payos v and  are realized.
3 Equilibrium analysis
We solve the model by backward induction. We begin by deriving the agent's choices
at date 3 and then state the principal's optimization problem at date 2. Next, to
derive the equilibrium of the game, we proceed in three steps. In step 1 we determine
the principal's information system choice for a given incentive contract. In step 2 we
derive the incentive contracts for the information systems found in step 1. In step 3
we determine the prot maximizing combinations of information system and incentive
contracts.
3.1 Agent's choices at date 3
At date 3, for a given compensation contract, information design g() and signal realiza-
tion , the choice of activity levels maximizes the agent's expected utility conditional
on the signal realization,20
ar; at 2 arg max
ar;at
E[s(y)j]  C(ar)  C(at); (3)
20Technically, the posterior expectation upon observing  depends also on the properties of the
information system g(). We suppress it to save on notation.
11
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where E[s(y)j] = w + v  E[yj] and E[yj] = E[r(r)j]  ar + E[t(t)j]  at by (2).
Given our assumptions about i(i) and i, i 2 fr; tg, it holds that E[i(i)j] = E[i()j].
Therefore, the optimal activity levels take the form
aoi (v; ) =
v
c
 E[i()j] i 2 fr; tg (4)
and are increasing in the incentive weight v and in the posterior expectation of the
marginal productivity i(). Furthermore, since E[i()j] = 1+kiE[j]; the parameters
kr and kt determine how the agent's activities are aected by his expectations about
the common parameter . Specically, changes of E[j] have a higher impact on the
agent's production decision than on his earnings management choice if kr > kt ( > 1)
and vice versa if kr < kt ( < 1). Consequently, we say that, for a given posterior
expectation of the common parameter , the manager is more productive in value
creation than in earnings manipulation when  > 1 and vice versa when  < 1. Hence
low values of  imply high manipulation threat, whereas high values of  are indicative
of low manipulation threat. For future reference, date 3 expected gross outcome and
performance measure are:
xo(v; ) = aor(v; )E[r()j] =
v
c
(E[r()j])2; (5)
yo(v; ) = xo(v; ) + aot (v; )E[t()j] =
v
c

(E[r()j])2 + (E[t()j])2 : (6)
3.2 Principal's choice problem at date 2
At date 2, the principal simultaneously chooses the contract s(y) and the information
system g() after taking into account the agent's choices and their eect on the rm
value and the performance measure at date 3. Her optimization problem is given by:
max
g();v;w
E[xo(v; )  (yo(v; )  xo(v; ))  s(yo(v; ))] (7)
s.t. E
"
s(yo(v; )) 
X
i=r;t
C(aoi (v; ))
#
 0 (8)
E[G(j)] = F () (9)
12
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where xo(v; ) and yo(v; ) are dened in (5) and (6). Furthermore, (8) is the agent's
participation constraint and (9) is the Bayesian plausibility constraint. Since the par-
ticipation constraint is binding, the principal's objective function simplies to:
 (v)  E[(v; )]; (10)
where
(v; )  xo(v; )  (yo(v; )  xo(v; )) 
X
i=r;t
C(aoi (v; )) (11)
is the total surplus of the agency as a function of the PPS, the signal realization  and
the information system design g().
3.2.1 The bang-bang nature of the optimal information design
To understand the economic forces driving the simultaneous solution to the principal's
choice problem, it is instructive to rst focus on the direct eect of information and
study the optimal choice of the information system for a given PPS.
Proposition 1 There exists a critical value bv  2(2 )
2+1
such that, at date 2, for given
positive v, the principal chooses a perfect information system if v  bv and an uninfor-
mative system otherwise.
The result in Proposition 1 shows that the magnitude of the incentive rate is pivotal
for the principal's choice of the information system. If the PPS is relatively low so that
v  bv, the principal optimally implements a system that perfectly reveals the value of
 before the agent makes his decisions.21 In contrast, if the PPS is relatively high so
that v > bv, the principal prefers that the agent makes his choice based on the prior
expectation about .
21The informativeness of the system can be restricted for various reasons. If there is a limit to how
much can be learnt, the solution would still be bang-bang between an uninformative system and the
most informative one that can be achieved. If the principal were to bear a convex cost of information
precision, the precision of the information system would be a function of v and . Similar to our result
in Proposition 1, at some suciently high v the principal would prefer to switch to uninformative
system.
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Our result implies that incentives and information design are substitutes in the sense
that low-powered incentives increase the likelihood that the principal designs a system
that provides information about the state and vice versa. To gain intuition for the
bang-bang character of the optimal information system, note that, as we show in the
proof of Proposition 1, the principal's objective in (10) can be presented as:
 (v) = const+
v
c
 (k
2
r + k
2
t )
2
(bv   v)  V ar(E[j]): (12)
The expression in (12) shows that, for a given PPS, the principal's choice of the in-
formation system boils down to choosing the variance of the conditional expectation.
The impact of V ar(E[j]) on the principal's expected prot depends on the relative
magnitude of v vis a vis bv. If the agent faces lower-powered incentives (v < bv), the
principal benets from a high variance of the posterior expectation. On the other hand,
if the agent faces high-powered incentives (v > bv), the principal benets from a low
variance of the posterior expectation. Lastly, at the knife-edge case when v = bv, the
principal is indierent. By the Law of total variance, V ar(E[j]) 2 [0; V ar()]. For
an uninformative system the variance of the posterior expectation is zero. In contrast,
if the system is perfectly informative, the signal  reects the realization of the actual
parameter  and so the variance of the posterior expectation E[j] equals the prior
variance V ar(). Taking into account our indierence assumption, the principal chooses
a perfect information system if v  bv and an uninformative system if v > bv.
To get further intuition, note that the principal's objective in (10) is essentially
the expectation of the total surplus in (11). Consistent with Kamenica and Gentzkow
(2011) and, more fundamentally, with Jensen's inequality, the curvature of this function
determines the optimal choice of the information system. Specically, it is easy to show
that, for given positive v, the total surplus (v; ) is convex in E[j] if v  bv and
concave in E[j] if v  bv. Rearranging the expression for the total surplus in (11)
shows that E[r()j] and E[t()j] not only determine the activity levels but also the
net benet of production and the total cost of manipulation:
(v; ) = aor(v; )E[r()j]  C(aor(v; ))| {z }
net benet of production
   aot (v; )E[t()j]  C(aot (v; ))| {z }
net cost of manipulation
:
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The net benet of production is the dierence between the expected terminal value
aor(v; )E[r()j] and the cost of value creation C(aor(v; )). Since both the agent's
equilibrium activity levels in (4) and the marginal eort productivity are increasing
in the posterior expectation E[j], the net benet of production is monotonically
increasing and strictly convex in E[j]: By the same token, the net cost of manipulation
is monotonically increasing and strictly convex in E[j]. However, since it enters the
total surplus with a negative sign, (v; ) is essentially the sum of two components that
are convex and concave in E[j], respectively. Clearly, if the agent's net contribution
to terminal value has a stronger impact on the curvature of the total surplus then the
net cost of manipulation, (v; ) is convex, otherwise it is concave.
The critical value bv for the contract slope above which the total surplus becomes
concave is determined by equating the second derivative of (v; ) with respect to
E[j], to zero. The second derivative is proportional to the term
v

1  v
2

k2r| {z }
production eect
  v

 +
v
2

k2t ;| {z }
manipulation eect
(13)
which represents the relative importance of the value and the manipulation cost com-
ponents on the curvature of the total surplus. The rst term in (13) represents the
positive production eect. It is increasing at a decreasing rate in the PPS and pro-
portional to k2r , the change of the marginal productivity with respect to an increase of
the conditional expectation E[j]. The second term in (13) represents the negative
manipulation eect. It is decreasing in v at an accelerating rate and proportional to k2t ;
the change of the principal's manipulation cost in response to a marginal increase of
E[j]. Put dierently, a higher PPS attens the convex component of the total surplus
and exacerbates the concavity of the second component. As a result, if v is suciently
high, the total surplus becomes concave in the posterior. Otherwise, it remains convex.
Specically, equating the expression in (13) to zero shows that, for given kr and kt,
if v < bv the term (13) is strictly positive; if v > bv it is strictly negative; and in the
knife-edge case of v = bv it is zero. The following result is immediate without a formal
proof.
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Corollary 1 The critical value bv is increasing in  and decreasing in .
To understand the intuition behind the comparative statics, consider again the term
in (13). For a given incentive rate v, the objective function is more likely to be convex
if higher values of E[j] have a stronger impact on the marginal productivity of the
agent's value creating activity (higher kr) but more likely to be concave if E[j] has a
stronger impact on the marginal productivity of the agent's window dressing activity
(higher kt). Thus, the rate  = kr=kt is a key determinant of the principal's incentives
to implement sources of information about . The higher (lower) , the more (less)
productive is the agent in creating value relative to manipulation earnings, the lower
(higher) is the manipulation threat and the more (less) is the principal inclined to design
a source of perfect information about the unknown productivity parameter. Likewise,
a stronger real eect on the rm's terminal cash ow (higher ) render it more likely
that  is concave in the conditional expectation of .
Taking into account the comparative statics in Corollary 1, and because v 2 [0; 1],
our next observations are immediate without a formal proof.
Corollary 2
(i) If  <   p, then bv < 0 and so the principal chooses an uninformative system
for any v > 0.
(ii) If     p1 + 2, then bv > 1 and so the principal chooses a perfect information
system for any v > 0.
There are two limit cases for which the choice of the information system is independent
of the PPS. If the agent is suciently more productive in manipulating earnings than in
creating rm value, i.e., the manipulation threat is suciently severe (so that  <
p
),
the principal implements an uninformative system for any v because bv < 0  v in this
case. In contrast, if the agent is suciently more productive in creating rm value,
i.e., the manipulation threat is suciently mild ( >
p
1 + 2  1), the principal
implements a perfect information system for any v because bv > 1  v in this case.
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Finally, if  2 K  (; ), the optimal information system depends on the magnitude
of v and the principal chooses a perfect information system only if v < bv. Intuitively, the
range in which the magnitude of the optimal incentive rate is pivotal for the principal's
information system choice is shifted to the right if the agent's earnings management
activities have real economic consequences ( > 0).22 Apart from these extreme cases,
the optimal information system depends on the magnitude of the PPS.
3.2.2 Optimal incentive rates under perfect or no information
In this section we focus on the interesting case where  2 [; ] so that the optimal infor-
mation system depends in a non-trivial manner on the magnitude of v. By Proposition
1, for any positive PPS the principal will choose either a perfect information system or
an uninformative one. If the PPS is zero then the principal will be indierent and will
choose a perfect information system as per our indierence assumption. Taking into
account this bang-bang nature of the optimal information system we can simplify the
principal's problem to comparing the solutions of the two mutually exclusive programs:
PI (perfect information system):
max
v2[0;1]
 (v)
s.t. v < bv; V ar(E[j]) = V ar();  2 [; ];
PU (Uninformative system):
max
v2(0;1]
 (v)
s.t. v  bv; V ar(E[j]) = 0;  2 [; ]:
As an interim step, we rst derive the unconstrained PPS for programs PU and PI
assuming that the respective constraints are satised. The solutions in Lemma 1 are
straightforward and presented without a formal proof.
22If earnings management only aects accounting income ( = 0), it holds that K = (0; 1) so that
the principal always strictly prefers an uninformative system for any v only if  = 0 and a perfectly
informative system whenever  > 1. In contrast, suppose that  = 1. Then, K = (1;
p
3) and the
principal strictly prefers an uninformative system for any v if  < 1 and a perfect information system
for all v only if  >
p
3.
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Lemma 1 Under information system j 2 fU; Ig the principal oers
vj =
1  2j
1 + 2j
< 1; where U =
t(E[])
r(E[])
; I =
s
E[t()2]
E[r()2]
(14)
and a xed component wj that satises (8) as an equality. The optimal PPS vj is
decreasing in  and j.
Because the performance measure y is an increasing function of ar and at, the
agent's activity levels are proportional to the incentive rate v. However, the contract
slope does not determine how the agent allocates his eorts between value creation and
window dressing. This choice depends on the task allocation ratio at=ar that captures
the incongruity of the performance measure y with the principal's objective x (Baker
1992; Feltham and Xie 1994).23 To see how the information system aects the task
allocation ratio, note that at=ar = t(E[])=r(E[]) under an uninformative system and
at=ar = t()=r() under a perfect information system. Thus, without information about
, the agent allocates his eorts according to the expected marginal productivities and
with perfect information about , he allocates his eorts according to the true marginal
productivities. In the former case, the principal can predict the agent's choice for a
given PPS because the expected marginal productivities are common knowledge at the
contracting date. In the latter case, however, the principal can only predict the agent's
choices conditional on the realized value of . Because the information arrives only after
the contract is signed, the principal must set a PPS that solves the multi-task problem
for the average agent. Depending on the severity of the manipulation threat, this
dierence can increase or decrease the expected agency cost caused by the multi-task
problem.
The xed component wj is used to transfer the expected surplus, net of the agent's
reservation utility, to the principal. The optimal incentive rate vj balances the expected
benets from inducing more productive action against the agency cost arising from the
23Specically, suppose that t() = 0 so that performance manipulation is not a concern. In this case,
x = y and j = 0 which implies that the principal's and the agent's objective are perfectly aligned and
the rst-best productive eort is induced by an incentive rate of v = 1. In our model, the presence of
manipulation threat renders the provision of incentive rate of one not optimal.
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manipulation of the performance measure. Intuitively, the equilibrium PPS is low if
the real eects of earnings management are more severe (high ) and if the agent is
expected to be relatively more productive in manipulating earnings then in creating
value (high j).
24 To illustrate this point, it is instructive to decompose the date 2
surplus into an expected value component and a second term representing the expected
agency cost
 j(v) = E[x
o(v; )  C(aor(v; ))]| {z }
expected rm value
  2j  E[  xo(v; ) + C(aor(v; ))]| {z }
expected agency cost
; j 2 fU; Ig:
(15)
The value component in (15) measures the expected net contribution of the agent's
production. The expected agency cost measures the joint loss caused by the agent's
personal cost of manipulating the performance measure and the real eects associated
with this manipulation as measured by the parameter . Both components are scaled
by the square of the ratios j indicating that the agency cost is increasing as the agent
becomes relatively more productive in manipulating the rm's earnings. Substituting
for the agent's activity levels from the incentive constraint, it can be shown that the
principal's surplus is proportional to the expression
v 
h
1  v
2

| {z }
net value eect
  2j 

 +
v
2
i
| {z }
agency cost eect
; j 2 fU; Ig: (16)
Maximizing the expression in (16) yields the optimal contract in (14). Since the value
eect in (16) is independent of the rm's information system, the dierence in the two
incentive rates is determined by the agency cost eect. Particularly, since higher values
of j increase the marginal cost of monetary incentives to the principal, the optimal PPS
with perfect information must be lower than the PPS with no information if I > U
and vice versa.
24A positive PPS requires that 2j < 1, otherwise the principal will nd it optimal to set no
incentives (v = 0) because the net marginal benet from inducing productive activity is lower than the
marginal cost of performance manipulation. To avoid unnecessary case distinctions, we only consider
model parameters where this condition is met for all information systems. That is, it holds that
2j < 1 for j 2 fU; Ig.
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vI
vU

v
Figure 2: Incentive rates with perfect and uninformative systems
Numerical example with  = 0:5, E[] = 0:5, V ar() = 3, kt = 1, kr =   kt
Solid (dashed) line represents the incentive rate with perfect (uninformative) system
Corollary 3 The optimal incentive rates vI and vU are strictly increasing in  and it
holds that vI R vU if and only if  R 1.
As seen from Lemma 1, the optimal incentive rates are decreasing functions of  and
i. Since the relative importance of real eects () is not aected by the information
system in place, the dierence in incentive rates can only be caused by the dierence in
the relative productivities as measured by i. While U = t(E[])=r(E[]) is a function
of the prior expectation about the productivity parameter, I =
p
E[t()2]=E[r()2]
also considers the variance in the productivities because the productivity parameter 
is unknown at the contracting stage. Moreover, since E[i()2]   i(E[])2 = V ar(i())
for i 2 fr; tg, this variance increases both the principal's expected benets and costs
from providing the agent with information about . In fact, using the denition of 2I
it is easy to see from the expected surplus expression in (16) that the principal benets
from V ar(r()) but suers from V ar(t()) because the agency cost is decreasing in
the former and increasing in the latter case. Intuitively, providing information about
20
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3484199 
 increases the agent's expected contribution to rm value in the former case and the
expected agency cost in the latter case.
Evaluating the relative magnitude of the incentive rates requires a comparison of the
expected productivities for both information regimes. Straightforward algebra shows
that the incentive rate under perfect information is higher than the one under no infor-
mation if:
kr
p
V ar()
1 + krE[]
>
kt
p
V ar()
1 + ktE[]
: (17)
Put dierently, if the relative dispersion of the value creation productivity is larger than
the relative dispersion of the manipulation productivity, the principal benets from
providing the agent with a higher PPS because providing the agent with information
mitigates the threat of manipulation and reduces the agency cost. If the opposite
holds, providing the agent with information exacerbates the manipulation threat and
increases the agency cost. Therefore, the principal sets a higher incentive rate with an
uninformative system if condition (17) is violated. It follows from the denition of 
that vI R vU if and only if  R 1.
3.2.3 Equilibrium
As a nal step we consider which of the two solutions to the principal's simultaneous
information design and contracting problem is globally optimal. Let v denote the
equilibrium PPS.
Proposition 2 If   1 the principal oers v = vI for any  2 [; ] and implements
a perfect information system. If  < 1 there exists a unique threshold value b 2 (; 1)
such that:
(i) If  2 [; b), the principal oers v = vU and implements an uninformative
system.
(ii) If  2 [b; ], the principal oers v = vI and implements a perfect information
system.
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The range of productivity ratio [b; ] for which the principal implements a perfect in-
formation system is increasing in .
The result of Proposition 2 is graphically illustrated in Figure 3. A consistent
choice of v and g() requires that all constraints are satised. That is, an uninformative
system can only be optimal if vU > bv and a perfect information system can only be
optimal if vI  bv. Since bv > vI if  > 1 but vI > vU , it is easy to see that the
principal always strictly prefers a perfect information system if  > 1. This solution is
quite intuitive because, for mild manipulation threat ( > 1), more precise information
about  increases the principal's expected benet from allowing the agent to tailor
his productive decision to the actual productivity without imposing too high of a cost
from earnings management. In fact, it can be shown that in this parameter region
the dierence between bv and vI is strictly positive and increasing in . Since the
distance between bv and vI scales the impact of the conditional variance on the principal's
expected prot and thereby her expected benets from providing the agent with more
precise information, higher values of  make the provision of information more attractive
to the principal.
Lower values of  have the opposite eect on the principal's expected prot. In
particular, whenever  < 1, information about  exacerbates the agent's manipulation
tendency. Moreover, lower values of  reduce the expected benet from allowing the
agent to tailor his productive activity. However, since the total surplus is strictly
convex in E[j] if  = 1 and  < 1, the principal still prefers to implement a perfect
information system provided that 1 >  > b and  < 1. If  < b the principal
strictly prefers to implement an uninformative system because the benet derived from
tailoring the agent's production to the true productivity is outweighed by the increasing
manipulation cost. In this case, it holds that bv < vU so that providing information to
the agent reduces the principal's expected prot. Accordingly, the principal does best
by implementing an uninformative system.
Note that the second solution can never be optimal if the agent's earnings manage-
ment activities have a signicantly negative impact on rm value (  1). Then, the
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vI
vU
bv

v
bL H
v = vU v = vI
Figure 3: Optimal incentive rates
Numerical example with  = 0:5, E[] = 0:5, V ar() = 3, kt = 1, kr =   kt
Solid line represents the equilibrium incentive rate. Here, b = 0:79.
principal always provides the agent with perfect information about  despite the fact
that the agent's earnings management have severe nancial consequences. The reason
is that, for   1, the principal oers v > 0 only if  > 1 because, otherwise, a positive
incentive rate would destroy more value than it creates. However, if  > 1, it holds
that bv > vI > vU so that the total surplus is always strictly convex in E[j].
Corollary 4 The optimal pay-performance sensitivity v is increasing in  for any
 < b and  > b but lim!b  v > lim!b+ v. Furthermore, there exist L 2 [0; b) and
H 2 (b; 1) such that:
(i) For any  < L the principal implements an uninformative system and oers
a PPS that is strictly lower than the PPS she oers when  > H and she
implements a perfect information system.
(ii) For any  2 (L; b] the principal implements an uninformative system and oers
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a PPS that is strictly higher than the PPS she oers when  2 (b; H) and she
implements a perfect information system.
When  = 0 the principal prefers to implement a system that provides no informa-
tion and oers a PPS of vU . This is because if  = 0 then kr = 0, i.e., information
does not help with value creation but only exacerbates the earnings manipulation. As
 increases, the manipulation threat becomes less severe. As shown in Figure 3, while
the principal still prefers to provide no information, the conditionally optimal incentive
rate vU increases because kr is now strictly positive and higher PPS will encourage
value creation.
At some critical value b the principal nds it optimal to switch to a perfect informa-
tion system and oer the conditionally optimal pay-performance sensitivity vI . Becauseb is strictly lower than 1 (the value at which the two conditionally optimal incentive
rates intersect), it holds that vU < vI at b so that v drops from a level of vU to a
level of vI . Hence, there is always a set  2 (b; H) of rms that optimally combine
a perfect information system with a low PPS and a second set of rms  2 (L; b]
that optimally combine an uninformative system with a higher PPS. Notably, even
though the performance measure of rms in  2 (L; b] is more prone to gaming than
for those in  2 (b; H), the former group of rms optimally provides higher-powered
incentives than the latter. In summary, our results imply that: (i) information design
and nancial incentives may be substitutes in solving the rm's incentive problem and
(ii) the combined optimal use of information and incentives in solving the underlying
agency problem can surprisingly render it optimal to provide the agent with higher
PPS if the performance measure is more prone to gaming. This oers a qualication of
the predictions made by prior literature studying optimal incentives for a given infor-
mation environment (e.g., Beyer, Guttman and Marinovic 2014). Our results suggest
that future empirical studies could include proxies for information environment and
manipulation threat.
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4 Model variations
4.1 The role of internal controls
The analysis of section 3 focuses on the interplay between information design and
monetary compensation in balancing the agent's incentives to create rm value and to
manage earnings. Frequently, rms also use their internal control system to increase
the reliability of their nancial reporting. To allow for this possibility we assume that
a given level of internal control eort e raises the agent's marginal cost of earnings
management by the amount ce. Establishing an internal control system comes at a cost
Q(e) which is quadratic with Q(0) = 0 and Q00(e) = n. To avoid trivial solutions where
the internal control system completely discourages the agent's earnings management
activities, we assume that n is suciently large.25
To analyze how the internal control system aects the solution of the agency prob-
lem, we consider two dierent scenarios. First, we study the case where the principal
commits to the level of internal control along with her choice of the information system
and the PPS of the agent's contract at date 2. Second, we also study the case where the
principal sets the control level after observing the signal about the unknown parameter.
If the principal decides on the control level before observing the signal, she must x e
based on her prior expectations about the marginal productivity in managing the rm's
earnings. In contrast, if the principal sets e after observing , she can tailor the internal
control system to the updated information about the marginal productivity.
Proposition 3 If the principal commits to a control system at date 2, she chooses a
control level of e =   E[t()]=n which is independent of the information system and
incentive rate choices at date 2.
If the level of internal control is chosen early, it is independent of the other decisions
taken at date 2, i.e., information system and incentive rate. Accordingly, the principal
adopts the same policy as dened in Proposition 3. The reason for this result is twofold.
25The minimal n that supports a positive manipulation in equilibrium is provided in the proof of
Lemma 3.
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First, the principal commits to the control level before the information system generates
a signal and so the control level only enters the total surplus as a linear term. Hence, the
curvature of the total surplus is independent of the control level so that the condition
for the optimal choice of the information system in Proposition 1 remains the same.
Second, the choice of e is independent of v because the agent corrects his manipulation
by the control level e. In fact, in equilibrium, the agent chooses manipulation level of
aot (v; e; ) = v E[t()j]=c  e, which is additively separable in e and v. This structure
implies that, in equilibrium, the manipulation cost C(aot (v; e; ; g()) + e) = C(aot (v; ))
is independent of the optimal control level and identical to the manipulation cost in
the baseline model. The principal benets from the internal control system because the
agent reduces the level of earnings management. In equilibrium, this reduction equals
e and the principal increases her expected prot by the amount E[t()]e   Q(e) =
2
2n
(1 + ktE[])
2.
Now consider a scenario in which the principal chooses the internal control level at
date 3, after  is realized. Then, the level of internal control is no longer independent
of her other choices.
Lemma 2 If the principal chooses the internal control system at date 3, she chooses a
level of eo = (+ v) E[t()j]=n which is strictly higher than the socially optimal level
e =   E[t()j]=n.
If the principal delays the choice of internal control level until the signal about
 is observed, she can use the information to tailor the control level to the actual
manipulation productivity. Specically, the principal's choice then is given by eo =
( + v)  t()=n. However, this level is strictly higher than the level of control that
maximizes the total surplus of the agency for a perfect information system at date 3,
e =   t()=n. To understand why the principal's control level exceeds the social
optimum, recall that the agent's contract is set at date 2. At the contracting stage, the
principal anticipates that the agent's equilibrium manipulation level is decreasing in the
level of control and increases the xed component of pay accordingly.26 However, when
26In fact, it is easy to see that w = E[C(a
o
r(v; )) +C(a
o
t (v; e; ) + e)  vaot (v; e; )] is increasing in
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deciding on the level of control at date 3, the principal ignores the positive eect of
the expected control level on the xed component of the agent's pay because w is sunk
cost from the principal's perspective at this point. Therefore, the principal chooses a
level of late control that exceeds the social optimum. Interestingly, this result holds not
only under perfect information system as described above, but also under uninformative
one. Then, the optimal late control level is eo = (+ v) E[t()]=n which is higher than
the socially optimal control level e =   E[t()]=n = e. Put dierently, for a given
information system in place, the amount by which late control level exceeds the social
optimum is eo   e = v  E[t()j]=n.
Lemma 3 Suppose the principal chooses the internal control system at date 3.
(i) For a given incentive rate v, the critical rate below which the principal prefers a
perfect information system is given by bve, where it holds that bve  bv if   22
2+3
andbve > bv if  < 22
2+3
.
(ii) For a given information system, the principal oers the conditionally optimal
incentive rate
vej =
1  2j
1 +

1 +
c
n

2j
; j 2 fU; Ig
where it holds that vej < vj.
Anticipating the optimal level of control implemented at date 3, the principal's date
2 prot becomes
 (v) +
2   v2
2n
 (1 + ktE[])2 + k2t  V ar(E[j]) , (18)
where  (v) is the expected surplus in the baseline model without internal control and the
second term is the net eect of control on the rm's date 2 prot. Since the additional
prot component is a function of v and V ar(E[j]), the choices of the optimal PPS
and the information system are generally aected by the expected consequences of the
e because aot (v; e; ) = vE[t()j]=c  e:
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control activity undertaken at date 3 unless it happens to be that  = v so that the
second term in (18) vanishes.
Consider now the optimal PPS for a given information system in Lemma 3. Since
the additional prot component is monotonically decreasing in v, it must be that the
optimal PPS for a given information system is decreasing with late control. This is
because the principal controls too much ex post and the only way to balance this eect
is to set a PPS lower than the rate that maximizes  (v).
The eect of control on the critical value bve below which the principal prefers a
perfect information system is more subtle because the additional prot is increasing in
V ar(E[j]) if  > v but decreasing if  < v. Accordingly, the presence of late internal
control makes a higher posterior variance relatively more desirable if the cost of real
earnings management is more important for the rm's prot than the marginal cost of
rewarding the agent for his manipulation activities and vice versa. As a consequence,
the rm is less willing to provide the agent with access to perfect information if  < bv
(which is equivalent to  > 2
2
2+3
) and more willing to inform the agent if  > bv (which
is equivalent to  < 2
2
2+3
). Therefore it holds that bve < bv in the former case andbve > bv in the latter case.
Comparing the expected surplus of the principal under early control with that under
late control immediately, for given information system, yields the following result:
Proposition 4
(i) With an uninformative system in place, the principal strictly prefers early over
late control.
(ii) With a perfect information system in place, the principal prefers late control if
the following condition holds

veI
2
> 1 +
E[]2
k2t V ar()
; (19)
where veI depends on exogenous parameters and is dened in Lemma 3.
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While, by revealed preference, internal control benets the principal, she may prefer
to commit to the control level early, before observing the signal about . This is
because with late control the principal controls too much at date 3. Under a perfect
information system, whenever the real eects of earnings management are suciently
high, the additional prot derived from internal control is determined by the cost of
excessive control and the informational benets of tailoring the control level to the true
productivity. This trade-o is reected in condition (19). The higher  relative to the
optimal incentive rate veI , the higher the benets of avoiding the real eects of earning
management relative to the additional compensation cost caused by the manipulation
threat. On the other hand, a higher variance of  increases the expected benet of
tailoring the optimal control level to the true productivity and makes late control more
benecial for the principal.
Proposition 5 There exists   1 such that, in equilibrium, the principal chooses a
perfect information system if  >  for any . For  <  there exists a critical value
of be 2 [; 1) so that principal chooses a perfect information system and the incentive
rate veI if   be and an uninformative system with the incentive rate veU if  < be.
Combining the information design and incentive rate choices yields the same equilib-
rium structure as in Proposition 2. However, unlike the baseline model without internal
control, the principal now nds it optimal to choose a perfect information system re-
gardless of the agent's relative productivity level    whenever  is suciently high
(above some   1). The reason is that the real eects of earnings management not
only determine the magnitude of the PPS of the agent's contract but also the principal's
benet from an informed internal control. Since severe real eects reduce the optimal
PPS but increase the marginal benet of informed control, the principal nds it optimal
to choose a perfect information system regardless of the relative marginal productivity
if  is suciently high.
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4.2 The role of authority over information design
So far, we assumed that the principal is in charge of designing both the rm's informa-
tion system and the agent's compensation contract. In this section we briey study how
the results of the previous sections change if the agent is in charge of the information
design decision at date 2. Specically, we now solve for a Nash-equilibrium at date 2 in
which the agent chooses g() and the principal chooses v. In a richer model structure
where a board of directors or a specialized compensation committee takes the role of
the principal and the agent is the CEO, this setting represents a scenario where the
board retains the right to decide on the CEO's compensation contract but the decision
on the design of the rm's information system is in the hands of the CEO.
Proposition 6 Consider the baseline model without internal control. If the agent is in
charge of the information design, he always implements a perfect information system
and the principal oers incentive rate vI as dened in Lemma 1.
Dierent from our result in Proposition 1, the agent always nds it optimal to
implement a perfect information system at date 2. This result is independent of the
magnitude of the PPS set by the principal at date 2. Intuitively this result stems
from the fact that the agent not only benets from tailoring his value creating activity
but also his manipulation to the true productivity because both activities increase the
agent's expected compensation. As a consequence, the agent's date 3 utility is an
increasing and convex function of the conditional expectation E[j] which implies, by
Jensen's inequality, that the agent strictly benets from an informed choice of both
activities. Thus, in contrast to the principal, the agent always strictly benets from
a perfect information system regardless of the relative productivity in performing the
two activities.
Proposition 7 Consider the internal control model in section 4.1.
(1) With early control at date 2, the agent always implements a perfect information
system and the principal sets a control level e as dened in Proposition 3 and an
incentive rate vI as dened in Lemma 1.
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(2) With late control at date 3, there exists a critical value
bvD = 2n
c
(1 + 2)   1 ;
such that, for vej , j = I; U as dened based on exogenous parameters in Lemma 3:
(i) The agent implements a perfect information system and the principal sets
the optimal incentive rate veI if v
e
I  bvD.
(ii) The agent implements an uninformative system and the principal sets the
optimal incentive rate veU if bvD > veU .
(iii) If veU  bvD > veI , the agent implements a perfect information system with
probability  2 (0; 1) and an uninformative system with probability 1   .
The principal oers v = bvD.
(3) The optimal incentive rate in the mixed-strategy region is monotonically decreasing
in .
If the principal commits to an internal control system at date 2, this choice has no
consequences for the agent's information design problem. Because the principal cannot
condition her optimal control level on the true productivity in manipulating the rm's
earnings, the agent unambiguously benets from tailoring both activities to the true
productivity and strictly prefers a perfect information system.
However, if the principal chooses the level of control at date 3, the agent implements
a perfect information system only if his PPS is suciently high. Otherwise, he either
strictly prefers an uninformative system or chooses an uninformative system with pos-
itive probability. This result stands in sharp contrast to the principal's optimal policy
who, ceteris paribus, prefers a perfect information system for low incentive rates. This
dierence can best be understood by considering the dual role of information in the
late control scenario. On the one hand, the agent can increase his expected utility
by adjusting his decisions to the economic environment. On the other hand, precise
information allows the principal to implement a more eective control strategy, which
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Figure 4: Equilibrium with late control and agent's authority
Numerical example with  = 0:2, E[] = 0:5, V ar() = 3, kt = 1, kr =   kt, c = 1, n = 3.
Solid line represents the equilibrium incentive rate
in turn reduces the agent's expected utility. In fact, since an eective control strategy
reduces the agent's expected compensation and the reduction caused by internal control
is a convex function of the conditional expectation, the agent prefers less often a perfect
information system than in the absence of control.
Figure 4 illustrates, with a numerical example, the equilibrium in the late control
case. The piecewise solid line represents the optimal incentive rates along the equilib-
rium path. If the manipulation threat is relatively severe ( < 1), the condition in
Proposition 7(2)(ii), bvD > veU , is satised, and so the agent implements an uninforma-
tive system and the principal sets an incentive rate of veU . Intuitively, the agent prefers
not to gather information about the productivity if he is relatively more productive in
earnings manipulation than in value creation because in this case, the agent benets less
from tailoring his production action to the true productivity r() and suers more from
allowing the principal to tailor his control level to the true manipulation productivity
t(). If the manipulation threat becomes less pronounced (1   < 2), corresponding
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to the condition in Proposition 7(2)(iii), veU  bvD > veI , the agent adopts a mixed strat-
egy and implements a perfect information system with probability  and the principal
oers bvD: Finally, if the manipulation threat is very mild (  2), corresponding to the
condition in Proposition 7(2)(i), veI  bvD, the agent implements a perfect information
system and the principal sets the incentive rate veI .
As in the baseline model, the optimal PPS is a non-monotonic function of the agent's
optimal information design choice. Particularly, in the region of the mixed strategy
equilibrium the optimal PPS is monotonically decreasing in  because a less severe
manipulation threat lowers bvD keeping the agent indierent between choosing a perfect
and an uninformative system. Thus, if the agent is in charge of the information design,
there is always a non-empty set of agencies (in the numerical example represented by
 2 [1; 2]) for which the PPS of the optimal contract is increasing as the performance
measure becomes more prone to manipulation.
5 Conclusion
We consider a model where a rm manager is compensated on the basis of a perfor-
mance measure that is aected by his productive and unproductive \window dressing"
activities. The rm has authority over the implementation of an information system
that will generate decision-relevant information. Because of the multi-task problem,
the rm faces a trade-o between (i) the benets from allowing the manager to learn
information about the productivity in creating value, and (ii) the cost of allowing him
to learn about the productivity in manipulating earnings.
We identify conditions under which the implementation of a system that provides
perfect information is no longer optimal for the rm and it prefers not to implement
an information system. Notably, we identify conditions under which the information
system and the pay-performance-sensitivity of the optimal compensation contract are
substitutes in solving the rm's incentive problem in the sense that the rm optimally
combines a perfect information system with a low PPS or an uninformative system with
a high PPS. We show that the optimal combination of information design and nancial
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incentives may render it optimal to provide agents with high-powered incentives as
the performance measure of the compensation contract becomes more prone to gaming.
We also study the interplay between the rm's information and internal control systems
when the choice of the optimal control level can be made before or after the manager
observes any information. While internal control is always benecial, the rm may
prefer to commit early to the control level in order to avoid overinvesting in control ex
post. Finally, we nd that if the manager decides on the information design, he prefers
perfect information unless the rm uses the information for internal control.
Our results shed a new light on the mixed evidence about the empirical association
between nancial incentives and measures of earnings management. The model suggests
that the information environment in which rms operate as well as how prone are
their performance measures to manipulation could explain the cross-sectional variation
among rms. Future empirical studies analyzing this relationship could exploit our
predictions by including proxies for the information environment and the manipulation
threat of dierent rms and industries into their empirical research design.
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Appendix A: Notations and proofs
Variable Denition
x rm's terminal value
y rm's earnings
s(y) = w + v  y incentive contract
v incentive rate or pay-performance sensitivity (PPS)
 severity of the real eects of earnings manipulation
ar productive eort/activity (value creation)
at unproductive eort/activity (earnings manipulation)
C(ai) cost of activity i = r; t
i(i) = k0 + kii marginal productivity of activity i = r; t
 = kr=kt level of manipulation threat (low  indicates severe threat)
i =  + i parameter determining marginal productivity of ai, i = r; t
i random shock aecting activity i = r; t
 common parameter aecting both activities
 signal about  generated by the information system
F () prior cumulative distribution function (CDF) of 
f() prior probability density function (PDF) of 
G(j) cumulative distribution function (CDF) of posterior j
g(j) probability density function (PDF) of posterior j
Table A.1: Notations for the main model
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Proof of Proposition 1: Using (10) and (11), the principal maximizes
 (v) = E
"
xo(v; )  (yo(v; )  xo(v; )) 
X
i=r;t
C(aoi (v; ))
#
= E
hv
c

1  v
2

(1 + krE[j])2  

 +
v
2

(1 + ktE[j])2
i
Now note that E[(1 + kiE[j])2] = (1 + kiE[])2 + k2i V ar(E[j]) for i 2 fr; tg which
allows us to restate the problem as of maximizing
 (v) =
v
c

1  v
2

(1 + krE[])
2   v
c

 +
v
2

(1 + ktE[])
2| {z }
=const
+
v
c

1  v
2

 k2r  

 +
v
2

 k2t

V ar(E[j])
= const+
v
c
 (k
2
r + k
2
t )
2
(bv   v)  V ar(E[j]):
Hence, if v  bv, the principal's expected payo is increasing in the variance of poste-
rior expectations and the principal will choose a fully-informative system with  = .
Otherwise, the principal will choose uninformative system.
Proof of Corollary 3: From Lemma 1, the optimal incentive rate with perfect in-
formation is vI =
1 2I
1+2I
and with uninformative system is vU =
1 2U
1+2U
. Comparing
these expression, we can see that vI R vU if 2U R 2I , where 2i ; i 2 fU; Ig measures the
relative magnitude of the agency cost in the two information scenarios. Evaluating the
relevant expressions yields
2U =
t(E[])2
r(E[])2
; 2I =
E[t()2]
E[r()2]
=
t(E[])2 + V ar(t())
r(E[])2 + V ar(r())
:
Using the facts that V ar(i()) = k2i V ar() for i 2 fr; tg and  = kr=kt; it follows that
both incentive rates are increasing in  and that vI R vU if and only if  R 1.
Proof of Proposition 2: Given that, by Corollary 3, vI R vU i  R 1 and bv 2 [0; 1]
for  2 [; ] we conclude that at least one of the two conditions vI  bv or vU > bv is
always met.
We can distinguish three dierent cases. First, if   1 it easy to verify that bv > vI
and since vI > vU in this case, the optimal solution is to provide perfect information
and choose an incentive rate of vI if  > 1. This solution is also optimal if  < 1 as long
as bv > vU > vI . However, there are two more cases to consider. If vU > vI > bv, the
optimal solution is vU and the principal implements an uninformative system. However,
if vU > bv > vI both conditions are met. In this case, the principal chooses the incentive
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rate that yields the largest expected prot. Let  (v) denote the principal's objective
evaluated at an incentive rate v. If vU > bv > vI and  (vU) >  (vI), the rm chooses
vU and leaves the agent uninformed, whereas if vU > bv > vI and  (vU) <  (vI), the
rm chooses a perfect information system and sets the incentive rate vI .
The relevant solution depends on the values of  2 (; ) and   0. Consider now
the case where   1. Since  = p  1 for this case, it must be that bv > vI >
vU . Thus, if earnings management has suciently high real eects, the rm optimally
chooses a perfect information system and sets incentives vI .
Consider next the case, where  < 1. If   1 the solution is the same as for  = 1
but if  < 1, there is always a set of parameters for which the principal nds it optimal
to choose the incentive rate vU and to leave the agent uninformed. To show existence,
note that  (vU) =  (vI) = 0 if  = 0 and  = (0) = 0 because in this case it holds
that vU = vI = 0. However, if we evaluate prots and incentive rates for  2 (0; 1) and
 =  =
p
 > 0: We nd that
vU()
vI()
=
 (vU())
 (vI())
= 1 +
V ar()
k2rE[]
2 + 2
1+
((1 + )krE[] + )
> 1 (20)
which allows us to conclude that vU() > vI() and  (vU()) >  (vI()) if  2 (0; 1).
Moreover, since bv() = 0 for any , it holds that vU() > vI() > bv: It follows that the
rm optimally sets an incentive rate of vU and implements an uninformative system if
 2 (0; 1) and  = .
To determine b we rst note that the incentive rates and equilibrium prots are
monotonically increasing in  for  2 (; ) . Moreover, since vI > vU if  = 1, we
know that for  = 1 it holds that
 (vI)
 (vU)
=
vI
vU


1 +
(k2r + k
2
t )V ar()
(1 + krE[])
2 + (1 + ktE[])
2

> 1: (21)
Together with monotonicity, conditions (20) and (21) imply that there exists a unique
intersection point  = b < 1 so that the rm strictly prefers to leave the agent unin-
formed and sets v = vU if  < b and to inform the agent perfectly and set v = vI if
  b.
Proof of Corollary 4: Follows immediately by Corollary 3 (comparative statics of vj,
j = I; U) and Proposition 2 (b < 1). The cutos L and H satisfy the equality
lim
!L
vU = lim
!H
vI ; (22)
subject to L 2 [0; b] and H 2 (b; 1).
Proof of Proposition 3: With internal control, the agent's manipulation cost is
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C(at + e) and the second incentive constraint in (4) becomes
aot (v; e; ) =
v
c
 E[t()j]  e: (23)
Considering the modied incentive constraint and the principal's cost of control, the
total surplus at date 3 can be written as
(v; ) + E[t()j]  e Q(e): (24)
Since the second term in (24) is linear in E[j], the conditions for the rm's information
choice in Proposition 1 are not aected by the choice of e. At date 2, the rm maximizes
 (v) + (1 + ktE[])  e Q(e)
with respect to v; g() and e. Since the objective function is additively separable, the
optimal choices of solution of v; and g() are the same as in Proposition 2 and the rm
implements an optimal control level so that (1+ktE[]) = Q0(e). With Q(e) = ne2=2,
this condition yields the optimal control level e =   (1 + ktE[])=n:
Proof of Lemma 2: If the rm chooses e after observing , the optimal control level
maximizes the rm's prot at date 3 considering the agent's incentive constraints for
productive activity in (4) and manipulation in (23). For a given signal  and given
parameters of the compensation contract s(y), this prot takes the form
() = (1  v)  xo(v; )  ( + v)  aot (v; e; )  E[t()j]  w  Q(e):
Maximizing () with respect to e yields an optimal control level of eo = ( + v) 
E[t()j]=n. In contrast, for a given information system, the socially optimal eort
level maximizes the expression in (24_) yielding the solution e =  E[t()j]=n. Thus,
whenever v > 0, it holds that eo > e.
Proof of Lemma 3: Anticipating the control level choice in Lemma 2, the principal's
reduced form objective function at date 2 can be rewritten as
 (v) +
2   v2
2n
 (1 + ktE[])2 + k2t  V ar(E[j]) . (25)
Following the proof of Proposition 1, this expression can be rewritten as
/ const+

v (k2r + k
2
t )
2c
(bv   v) + 2   v2
2n

| {z }
H(v;)
 V ar(E[j]): (26)
To see how late control aects the optimal information system choice, recall that the sign
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of the expression in large brackets in (26), H(v; ), determines how the expected rm
prot varies with the variance of the posterior expectation. Evaluating this expression
at the critical incentive rate v = bv in the absence of control shows that the rm's
expected prot at date 2 is increasing in V ar(E[j]) at v = bv if  > bv and decreasing
in V ar(E[j]) if  < bv. Let bve denote the cuto-level for the rm's information system
choice with late control, it follows that
bve Q bv if  Q bv:
Substituting for bv yields the condition on exogenous parameters in the result. To derive
a closed form expression for bve note that H(v; ) has one positive and one negative root.
The relevant root is positive and takes the form
bve = 1
2(1 + )
bv +pbv2 + 4(1 + )  2 ;  = c
nk2t (1 + 
2)
:
Maximizing () with respect to v yields optimal incentive rates
vej =
1  2j
1 +

1 +
c
n

2j
; j 2 fU; Ig
for a given information system j 2 fU; Ig. Since n > c, the incentive rates with late
control are smaller than their counterparts without control in Proposition 2 but it still
holds that veI  veU if   1 and veI < veU if  < 1.
Proof of Proposition 4: The rst part is straightforward. We know from Proposition
3 that e maximizes the expected date 2 surplus. On the other hand, Lemma 2 implies
that e = e < eo, where eo = ( + v)  E[t()]=n and e =   t(E[])j=n for an
uninformative system. Thus, since late control provides no informational benets with
an uninformative system, it strictly reduces the rm's prot because it induces an
excessive level of control.
The second part is more subtle. With perfect information and late control, the
rm chooses the control level eo = ( + v)  t()=n >   t()=n = e that is perfectly
adjusted to the state of nature. However, since the control level is set before the signal
is observed, the control level with early control still equals e. Evaluating the expected
date 2 prots for both cases shows that late control is benecial if
 (v) +
2   v2
2n
 (1 + ktE[])2 + k2t  V ar() >  (v) + 22n  (1 + ktE[])2:
Simplifying this expression considering that the optimal incentive rate with perfect
information is veI yields the condition in (19).
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Proof of Proposition 5: The equilibrium has the same structure as in the baseline
model but the role of  is dierent from the solution in Proposition 2. Since the proof
of the equilibrium structure is similar to the proof of Proposition 2, we focus on the role
of  in determining the equilibrium. As in the baseline model the rm strictly prefers
a perfect information system if  = 1 because it holds that bve > bv > vI > veI > veU
for this case. However, unlike the baseline model, the rm strictly prefers to install a
perfect information system for all values  >  even if  < 1. For an uninformative
system to be optimal it must be that veU > bve for some  2 [; 1) and  2 (0; 1): Since
the potential benet of an uninformative system is the largest if  is low, it suces to
evaluate the term H(v; ) as dened in (26) at v = veU and  =
p
. Since bv = 0, and
kr =
p
kt for this case, H()  H(v(); ) takes the form
H() =  

(1 + )k2t
2c
+
1
2n

 veU()2 +
2
2n
;
where veU() =
1 2U ()
1+(1+ cn)
2
U ()
. Since H(0) < 0, H(1) > 0 and veU() is concave and
increasing for low values of  but decreasing as  gets larger, there is a unique value 
so that H() = 0 and the rm strictly prefers a perfect information for all  if   .
Finally, to assure that the agent's manipulation level is positive in equilibrium, it
must be that n > c  (1 + =vej ), where vej is the optimal incentive rate for information
system j 2 fU; Ig. The critical value follows from the fact that at = vcE[t()j]  e = 
v  (1
c
  1
n
)  
n
  E[t()j]. Equivalently, we can express this condition as a lower
bound on the optimal incentive rate. In fact, the optimal incentive rate must satisfy
that vej > v = c=(n  c) to assure that at > 0 in equilibrium. Since vej is a function of
; c; n; and 2j , this condition implicitly denes the set of model parameters for which
the problem has a meaningful economic solution.
Proof of Proposition 6: At date 2, the agent maximizes his expected utility for
given contract parameters v and w anticipating his optimal choices at date 3:
	 = E[v  yo(v; )  w  
X
i=r;t
C(aoi (v; ))]
= E

v2
2c
  (E[r()j])2 + (E[t()j])2
= const+
v2
2c
 (k2r + k2t )  V ar(E[j]):
This expression is monotonically increasing in V ar(E[j]). It follows that the agent
implements a perfect information system for all incentive rates set by the principal.
Considering the agent's optimal choice, the principal maximizes her date 2 objective
function  (v) with respect to v and sets the incentive rate v = vI in Lemma 1. This
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pair of strategies is a unique Nash equilibrium of the game.
Proof of Proposition 7: In line with the results of Propositions 3 and 3, the solution
distinguishes early and late (informed) choice of the control level e. With early control,
the agent's objective function for a given control eort becomes
	E = 	  E[v  e  E[t()j]] = 	  v  e  E[t()]; (27)
where the second term in (27) represent's the expected reduction of the agent's performance-
based compensation due to the principal's control. This term is linear in E[t()j]
because e is chosen before  is observed. It follows that the agent strictly prefers a
perfect information system for all incentives rates. Since early control does not aect
the principal's choice of the optimal incentive rate, the equilibrium is the same as in
Proposition 6.
With late control the principal chooses e at date 3 after observing . Considering the
optimal control level eo = (+ v)E[t()j]=n in Lemma 3, the agent's date 2 objective
with late control reads as
	L = 	  E

v  ( + v)  E[t()j]2
n

= const+ v 

v
2c
 (k2r + k2t ) 
k2t
n
(v + )

 V ar(E[j]):
It follows that the agent's expected prot is increasing in V ar(E[j]) if the term in
brackets is positive, or if
v >
2
n
c
(1 + 2)  1  bvD:
Thus, the agent strictly prefers a perfect system if v > bvD and an uninformative system
if v < bvD. Note rst that the agent always chooses a perfect information system if  = 0
because for this case bvD = 0 so that the agent strictly prefers a perfectly informative
system for all incentive rates.
Thus, an equilibrium in which the agent prefers an uninformative system for some
parameters requires that  is suciently large so that the optimal incentive rate can be
lower than bvD: Let v(; ) denote the incentive rate as a function of the parameters 
and . A sucient condition for the existence of more than one equilibrium is bvD(; 0) >
veU(; 0), where v
e
U(; 0) is the lowest possible incentive rate for an uninformative system
for a given value of  considering that veU is increasing in . This condition implicitly
denes a unique value  > 0 for which the equilibria in Proposition 7 exist.
Suppose that  > . Considering the optimal incentive rates for the late control
model in Lemma 3, it is easy to see that there are two Nash equilibria in pure strategies
and one Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. Particularly, if veI  bvD, the agent
implements a perfect information system and the principal sets the optimal incentive
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rate veI . It is easy to see that this is the only equilibrium if   1 because in this case, it
holds that veI  veU  bvD for all incentive rates vej > v; j 2 fI; Ug, where v = c=(n  c)
is the lowest incentive rate that induce a positive manipulation level in equilibrium as
dened in Lemma 3.
In contrast, if  < 1; there are two more equilibria because veI < v
e
U . First, ifbvD > veU > veI , the agent implements an uninformative system and the principal sets
the optimal incentive rate veU . However if v
e
U  bvD > veI ; there is no pure strategy
equilibrium that satises the agent's condition for optimal information design and the
principal's rst-order condition. In this case, there is no equilibrium in pure strategies
because if the agent chooses V ar(E[j]) = 0, the principal sets v = veU but since
veU > bvD, the agent would like to deviate and choose V ar(E[j]) = V ar(). However,
if the agent chooses a perfect information system, the principal sets v = veI . Again,
since veI < bvD, the agent would like to deviate and choose the uninformative system.
The equilibrium in this case is in mixed strategies. Let  2 [0; 1] denote the proba-
bility the agent assigns to the choice of a perfect information system. The equilibrium
solves the following pair of maximization problems
max
v
   (v; V ar()) + (1  )   (v; 0); (28)
max

 	L(v; V ar()) + (1  ) 	L(v; 0); (29)
where  (v; V ar()) and 	L(v; V ar()) are the principal's and the agent's expected date
2 payos for a perfectly informative system and  (v; 0) and 	L(v; 0) are the principal's
and the agent's expected date 2 payos for an uninformative system, respectively. It is
easy to see that the strategy prole
v = bvD;  =  v(bvD; 0)
 v(bvD; 0)   v(bvD; V ar())
solves the pair of rst-order conditions of the player's maximization problems (28) and
(29). Note that  2 (0; 1) because we are in the region where vU > bvD > vI . Specically,
 v(bvD; 0) > 0 because vU > bvD and  v(bvD; V ar()) < 0 because bvD > vI .
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Appendix B: Modeling information design
Option 1. The design of the information system can be portrayed by a function
(; ) :    ! [0; 1]. It determines the probability with which the feasible signal
realizations are produced for each state realization. Given , any signal realization 
updates the beliefs about  to F;(j;) which is equivalent to G(j) in our base
model. A perfect information system is characterized by (; ) = 1 if  = . An
uninformative system is characterized by (; ) = const for any  and .
To illustrate with a specic example, suppose that  = fL; Hg and  = fL; Hg.
The prior distribution is represented by Pr( = i), whereas the choice of infor-
mation design is represented by (i; j) = Pr(jji) and the conditional distribu-
tion by Pr(jji) for all i; j = H;L. Consistent beliefs imply that the condition
Pr(j) = Pr(i)Pr(jji)+Pr( i)Pr(jj i) has to hold for all i; j = H;L. A perfect
information system is characterized by (i; i) = Pr(iji) = 1 and an uninformative
system by (i; j) = Pr(jji) = 1=2, for all i; j = H;L.
Option 2. The information system can be portrayed by an additive signal technology
 =  +  1  ;
where  is a nonnegative parameter and  is a noise term with mean zero and variance
V ar(), drawn from a given probability distribution with density h() and unbounded
support. Using standard methods for the bivariate transformation of random variables,
the joint distribution of  and  takes the form
g(; ) = f()  h(  (   ))  :
The parameter  completely characterizes the information system. For nite and pos-
itive values of , g(; ) denes the distribution of posterior beliefs g(j) = g(;)R
g(;)d
,
where higher values of  reduce the variance of the signal and make the information
system more informative. As special cases,  ! 1 represents a perfect information
system and  ! 0 represents an uninformative system.
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